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WHERE IS THE CIO GOING?
By GEORGE MORRIS

What happened to the c.I.O.? The question is heard on all sides.
For some time it has been evident that the c.I.O. was being led
away from the fighting, drive-ahead spirit that won it great support in earlier days. The sweeping organizing drives and pacesetting economic gains that made it so attractive to the workers
in the past are now giving way to internal strife, inter-union raiding, Red-baiting, witch-hunting, stagnation and decline.
The c.I.O.'s leaders were once the targets of union-haters. They
were Red-baited. Today the union-haters sing hosannas to most of
these very leaders beCause they themselves picked up Red-baiting
and witch-hunting as weapons against progressives in the unions.
The recent C.1.O. convention in Portland brought the long developing situation to a head. Differences carne out into the open and
were fought out between the dominant Right and progressive Left.
For the first time a c.I.O. convention faced two sets of resolutions.
What's behind this · division in the C.1.O.? Who is responsible
for it? How can the c.I.O. be brought back to the forward-looking
path it followed in its earlier days? For an adequate answer to
those questions we should first retrace the c.I.O.'s development both
to the time of its birth-days when it was united and progressive
-and further back, to the historic conditions that led to its rise.
The c.I.O.'s birth in 1935 was the high point of a struggle for
a progressive trade union program that had been going on for
generations. The roots of labor progressivism, commonly referred
to as the Left wing, run back to the movements led by labor's
trail-blazers in the last century. They encountered the same type
of persecution, abuse and Red-baiting that all fighters face today.
William Sylvis, the moulder who formed the first national labor
federation in America, was denounced as a "dangerous radical"
because he called for an eight-hour day when most workers still
worked, ten, twelve, and more hours, because he advocated social

legislation, established ties with the organized labor movement
abroad ·led by Karl Marx, ahd spoke of the interests of the workers
as class interests. The Left-wing trail continued through the men
of the eighties who went beyond raising of the slogan for an eighthour day and led a general strike movement for it. Some of them,
like the Haymarket Square victims, were denounced as "Reds"
and "internationalists," were framed and paid the death penalty.
Eugene Victor Debs, the railroad man, was another of the great
Left-wing figures. He organized the first big national union of
railroad workers on an industrial basis and demonstrated by his
personal, fighting leadership the superiority of such an organization
over the old craft form.
.
Then came "Big Bill" Haywood, the miner, who personified the
freshness, vigor and fighting-spirit of our developing West. He led
the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) in its most constructive days when it marched under the banner of industrial
unionism and fought some of the most militallt battles in American ·
labor history. The trend of fighting progressivism continued through .
many others-men like Tom Mooney whom the union-haters entombed for a generation in San Quentin on charges that were
proven a frame-up.
The forerunner with the most profound influence upon the rise
and development of the c.I.O. was the militants' movement in
the A. F. of L. led by William Z. Foster, today chairma.n of the
Communist Party.
The Trade Union Educational League (later the Trade Union
Unity League) which he founded stormed the stagnant, bureaucratic horse-and-buggy spirited A. F. of L. leadership some fifteen
years prior to the birth of the c.I.O. The movement led by Foster
rounded out and raised to new heights the progressivism that had
been shaping up in the ranks of the working class of America:
The Left-progressive principles associated with Foster's name
were hammered out and tested in sharp struggles against the polides of union collaboration and collusion with employers, racketeering, bureaucracy and do.;nothingism that the A. F. of L.'s leaders
followed in the "prosperity" twenties and crisis thirties, and in
struggles· against the Gompany-unionism and open-shoppism of
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that period. The T.U.E.1. was the principal force in labor's ranks
that kept alive the fire of genuine unionism and working-class
solidarity at a time when many labor lea~ers followed policies that
were literally extinguishing the labor movement. The Left-pro- .
gressives were the principal initiators of s!ruggles against reaction '
in those days-notably in coal, maritime, needle trades, textile,
auto, and agriculture, while the Right-wing leaders had virtually
abandoned the strike weapon. The latter even tied wages to ,productivity and cooperated with employers on speed-up and bonus
swindles. When confronted with dissatisfaction and revolts among
their members, the Right-wingers in power often depended on
.hired gangsters to keep them. in office.

LEFT PROGRAM TAKES SHAPE
What are some of the features of the 'Left-progressive program
that emerged in that pre-c.I.O. struggle against labor bureaucracy
and "golden rule" open-shop paternalism? We will list only a few
of the major ones:
1: Organization of the unorganized, especially in the basic
mass production industries. The central theory of the A. F. of 1.
was still guided by the antiquated formula that only skilled workers are organizable and only their demands can be bargained for
collectively. This policy left the major industries to company
unions and 90 per cent of the country's workers unorganized.
2. Industrial unionism, or amalgamation of existing craft unions,
as the only effective form through which the bulk of the unorganized workers could be unionized. The A. F. of 1. considered
the craft form as the primary form of union, with each one of them
interested in only those workers in a plant under its jurisdiction.
3. Militancy and a strike strategy that involved the mass of the
affected workers through a rank and file machinery, as the key to
victory. The A. F. of 1. leaders minimized the strike as a weapon
and frowned upon militancy. They steered toward strikeless, collusive relations with employers on a claim that such was the path
to advancement for the workers .
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4. Independent political action by labor and establishment of a
new people's party to express the class and anti-monopoly interests
of the working class and its allies. The A. F. of 1. leaders opp<?sed
the very concept that the working class of America is a class and
needs its own political party. They held down labor:s political consciousness to a minimum or confined it to a choice within the
framework of the two old parties of capital.
5. Trade union democracy and elimination of all forms of
racketeering, gangsterism and bureaucracy in the unions. This program challenged the dictatorial regimes in A. F. of 1. unions and
the numerous practices of fraud and terror that were used to perpetuate reactionaries in union office.
6. Rejection of Red-baiting in all its forms and guarantee of full
political freedom and rights to all, including Communists. This
was especially directed against the practice begun by A. F. of 1.
leaders of inserting clauses in union constitutions batring Communists from membership or office. This weapon was in reality directed
against all opponents of reactionary administrations upon whom
the "Red" label could be tagged.
7. The struggle for the rights of the Negro people as one of the
most important tasks constantly confronting all unions. The unions
themselves must be freed of Jim Crow and any other form of
hidden or open discrimination and white supremacism. The
A. F. of 1. of that period virtually ignored the problem of Negro
rights and to an even greater extent than t·oda y was honeycombed
with constitutional and .hidden race bars. Hardly a union elected
a Negro to office.
8. The shop steward system through which rank and filers on the
job are the most vital machinery of the union. This slogan was
frowned upon by the A. F. of L.'s top leaders because imposition of
tight union control from the top was their formula.
9. Rank: and file control with contracts subject to democratic discussion and approval. This was aimed at the sell-out practices that
were so common in those days with contracts often going into
effect without so much as the membership approval of the new
terms.
10. Internatio~~lism, expressing the common inter; st of Ameri-
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can workers with those of other lands, demands an organizational tie to a world organization of labor. The A. F. of L. most often
screened its membership from international problems.
11. The struggle for peace, with U.S.-Soviet friendship the
keystone of security from war. The A. F. of L. leadership traditionally left foreign policy to the Wall Streeters. They even continued
their opposition to recognition of the Soviet Union by the United
States after the Roosevelt administration opened diplomatic relations with it.
"
12. Unemployment insurance and adequate old age security.
These measures were advocated and fought for by the Left forces
even before the 1929 crisis. But the A. F. of L. opposed jobless
insurance until its 1933 convention when some 15 million were
already unemployed.
Is there anything in the above 12 points that smacks of
((foreign influence" or «totalitarianism"'? The Left fought .
for the above program years before anyone even dreamed
of a C.I.O. These issues were fought over in most union conventions of the twenties and early thirties. In some cases
resolutions embodying most of die above program will be
found approved in the bulky conve)ltion records of important unions.

HOW THE C.I.O. DEVELOPED

The c.I.O. came about as a result of a split, lor the first time, in
the " top bureaucracy of the Right-wing camp. A number of leaders,
headed by Lewis, felt that the entire labor movement was doomed
to destruction if some real steps toward modernizing it were not
. aken. They anxiously watched powerful unions in Europe being
smashed by Hitler and saw how Right-wing leaders like themselves
were thrown into concentration camps. It was also apparent that the
A. F. of 1. craft union form brought no progress for labor in face
of a favorable opportunity offered under the Roosevelt administration and the Wagner Act.
Ie was clear that unless in?ustrial unionism was made the weapon
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no real organtzmg progress was possible. Industrial unionism and
organization of unorganized through a policy of supporting the proRoosevelt coalition, was the essence of the C.lO.'s program when
it was born. It soon became the rallying center of a coalition of
forces within the labor movement that included the Republican
Lewis and Democrats Murray and Hillman; Social Democrats like
David Dubinsky; Left-progressives like Harry Bridges, and Communists like Ben Gold.
When the big organizing drives of the C.I.O. got under
way in steel, rubber, electrical, auto, textile, marine and other
industries, the C.I.O. found it necessary to rely to a great
extent on the army of devoted and trained Left-wing fighters, many of them Communists. These forces had been educated and trained in the small, but active Left-progressive
movement led by Foster in pre-C.I.O. days. Also, pressed by
necessity and the influence brought in by the Left, the newborn C.I.O. accepted much of the program that had been
hitherto classed as Left.' It was soon reflected within the
C.I.O. in the rank and fileism, shop steward machinery, militancy, vigor, democracy, emphasis on Negro rights, an antimonopoly position and rejection of Red-baiting that characterized so much of its early life.
But the main characteristic of the new-born C.I.O. was its
unity around a central objective--organization of the unorganized workers in basic industry and doing i~ on its reputation as a fighter for real advancement of the economic
standards of the workers. That is what enabled · it to hold
the different groups together despite political and other differences among them. This unity for an objective also gave
the C.I.O. something to drive after and fight for and carried
it forward to win millions wIthin a couple of years.

This unity wasn't entirely smooth. It showed signs of cracking
even at the initial stage when David Dubinsky of the Ladies Garment Workers and Max Zaritsky of the Cap and Millinery Workers left the C.lO. They feared the militant progressivism that th~
C.I.O.'s drives was arousing throughout the country, even in their
own unions. Lewis himself took a walk at a later stage after unsuc"
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Cess fully trying to break away the CI.O. from the pro-Roosevelt
coalition and its support of an anti-fascist war program. But the
basic united front, of which a coalition between the forces around
Philip Murray and the left was the backbone, continued to hold
together through the war and for a short time after hostilities ended.
It held together despite constant attempts to disrupt it through
House Un-American Committee witch-hunts, the A. F. of L:s bureaucracy, Dubinsky's Social-Democratic friends within the CI.O.
like Walter Reuther and Emil Rieve, and of the Vatican-directed
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists.
Thanks to this unity, the C.I.O. stood far in front of all
labor in its contribution to the war effort against fascism,
while the same Social-Democratic, A.C.T.U., Red-baiting element that today calls the tune in the Rightwing camp,
obstructed the war effort.

COALITION FOR C.I.O. PROGRESS CRACKS

The breakup of the united front through which the CI.O. made
its historic advance, began when Murray and his associates in the
"middle" turned their back on the past program and went full hog
for the Truman Doctrine and the resultant Marshall Plan. His new
foreign policy was an undertaking to whip the unions into line for
the Marshall Plan at all costs. The inevitable result was the sidetracking of the economic and other domestic problems of the workers. Every past policy of the CI.O. began sharply · to contradict the
new foreign policy. Opposition to Universal Military Training in
face of the CI.O. leadership's support of a warlike policy against
the Soviet Union and of arming of a Western Bloc, became meaningless. The Portland convention dropped even the past formal
opposition to UMT. Similarly the past policy of organizing mass
campaigns of pressure upon the President and Congress fo~ labor's
demands was dropped. Already in June> 1947, on the eve of passage
of the ·Taft-Hartley Law, C.I.O. affiliates that called for a march on
Washington and other such forms to dramatize labor's sentiment,
were denounced by Murray. Also, the C.I.O:s official attitude toward
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the World Federation of Trade Unions changed overnight to one of
quitting it and working for its destruction. The Soviet trade unions,
so highly lauded in a pamphlet by a C.I.O. delegation that visited
the U.S.S.R: and praised by Murray himself, suddenly became "government dominated," and "slave labor" was just as suddenly discovered in the Soviet Union.
Life in the C.I.O. shifted quickly to factionalism over foreign policy. Wage raises, organization of the unorganized,
and other such objectives were effectively side-traclted. The
C.I.O.'s network of paid representatives and organizers became mainly occupied in a drive on opponents of the Marshall
Plan and supporters of the Progressiv~ Party. All C.I.O. state
and city councils were ordered to either comply with the
political position taken by the top leaders or face loss of their
charter. In its worst days the A. F. of L.'s leadership did not
try to dictate political views to its lower bodies. The C.I.O.'s
leaders sOon followed the pattern of bureaucracy set by the
A. F. of L. a generation back. Once more the progressive Left
was called upon to wage a new struggle against new forms
to company-unionize and paralyze the labor movement. But
the struggle is on a far more advanced stage of development
than it was in the days prior to the C.I.O.'s rise.
WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES?

The Portland convention's progressive-sponsored resolutions, reports, and speeches of delegates, indicated some of the differences
that had been brewing in the C.I.O. Some of 'these differences were
not fully reflected because of the limited opportunity for elaboration given the Left by the dominant Right wing. But the main
differences on issues in the c.I.O. were:
1. Organize the UN -~rganized!

Organization of the unorganized, the No.1 point on 'the c.I.O.'s
agenda, was virtually forgotten in the frenzied drive for the Mar-
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shall Plan. As these lines are written, the Southern organizing drive
is still nil in results and it hasn't moved much for two years. In place
of the earlier phenomenal gains in membership, the c.1.0. lost
heavily in a number of fields. Its main historic aim has now been
perverted into a vulture-like program of raiding and disorganizing
the organized. Lip service is still given to organizing among the 75
percent of the workers not in unions. But with most of its energies
and resources devoted to watchdog service over c.1.0. affiliates on
behalf of the Marshall Plan, results have been negligible.
The Left wing demands a return to the original C.I.O.
program of major emphasis on organizing work and genuine
mutual assistance among C.I.O.· unions, not raids and Uim_
perialist" swallowing up of smaller unions by a few large
ones. The Left calls for return to the USpirit of '36" when
ability and devotibn, and not one's political pedigree counted
in the choice of organizers.
.

2.

For Real Labor Unity!

The age-old principle of solidarity and unity was forgotten by the
Right wing. Even scabbing on sister unions is condoned, if the
victimized organization is on the "wrong" side of the political fence.
The Left aims to revitalize the principle of labor unity both
within the C.I.O. and within the labor movement as a whole.
It views the p~actice of using Taft-Hartley anti-Communist
affidavits against another union as no different from scal>bing.
It was always A.B.C. for labor that solidarity against employers knows no political or other differences among the
workers. The fibre of solidarity has been seriously strained
in recent years, especially since pre~sure of the Truman
Doctrine and T aft-Hartleyism became reflected in the labor
movement. Only a vigorous rank and , file movement could
return the spirit of unity to labor and force both the C.I.O.
and the A. F. of L. seriously to talk of uniting, or at least
acting together on issues affecting labor. The sad fact is that
after 14 years of division, A. F. of L. and C.I.O. leaders ac9

quired vested interests and entrenched themselves in their
separate fields. Only the Left, having no interest in maintaining the division, could view the problem from. the standpoint of its basic significance for the whole working "class.

3. Back, to a Fighting Wage Policy!

Leadershi p in raising wage standards, shortening the workweek .
and combating the killing speedup on the assembly lines, was the
principal reason for the c.I.O.'s popularity during its first decade.
The sweep in 1936-37 resultea overnight in significant material
gains. Workers saw and felt the result in their homes and in the
shops. The militancy and anti-monopoly character in the strikes and
drives in steel, auto, rubber, electrical and the other big corporation
fields, left a deep imprint upon the c.I.O. Settlement of grievances
was most often achieved through direct shop action led by stewards.
Stoppages often challenged excessive speedup_ Lightning response
from the workers made dismissal or penalizing of active unionists
too risky. Red-baiting was stamped as an employer tactic. The atmosphere was hardly the kind in which leaders like Murray, Rieve
and Reuther could flower out with their theories of labor-management love. But the turn of the C.I.O.'s leaders to cooperation with
the trusts on foreign policy and in the political field has, in the
recent period, also led to their yielding to the bosses on wage policy.
The wage resolution adopted at the Portland convention is an
example. This time the c.I.O. did not set its usual annual wage obj~ive. The resolution was an ambiguously-worded statement in
favor of a "high consumption level economy" with wages "a greater
share of an ever-increasing national income" and this is possible
"within the framework of a reasonable profit structure." This, in
plain language, is tying wages to productivity and "reasonable profit."
An employer who could "prove" that he didn't make a ':reasonable
profit" (whatever that is) or that either his productivity or the
national income isn't rising, is thus armed in advance with an argument against a needed raise.
.•
This wage policy is an old one. The A. F. of L, embarked upon it
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in 1925, in the heyday of a capital-labor love idyll. It was based
on the. theory that the parder the workers work for their boss the
more he'd be able to afford to pay them in wages. This nonsense was
effectively shattered with the 1929 crash. But the A. F. of 1. .dusted
off that resolution in its 1947 convention. The C.LO. dusted off the
discredited speedup and bonus schemes of the twenties with renewed ballyhoo for its so-called "Industry Coun:cil Plan" through
which employers, labor and government would be "partners" in
"planning" production. The very idea that our "free enterprising"
corporations would take labor into . "partnership" is laughable. But
the "Council Plan" is becoming a pattern for management~union
collaboration for speedup.
The C.lO. cannot yet point to a single employer who is even
inclined to put its "partnership" plan into effect. Its leaders often
point to the wartime joint production committees in the plants as
"proof" that their plan is possible. But this is a false comparison.
The wartime councils, which, incidentally, had their best support
from the Left wing, were based purely on wartime production needs.
They proved the contrary: that employers might agree to have a
joint talk-shop with their employees but won't give them the slightest real say on the affairs of an enterprise.
The "plan" also inspires a wage theory that brings higher profits
to employers and lower standards to C.lO. members. One example
is the General Motors-Reuther formula incorporated in the, two-year
contract signed in May, 1948. With an economic decline and a likely
drop in the Bureau of Labor Statistics cost-of-living index indicated,
Reuther obliged the corporation with a double escalator clause that
calls for a quarterly revision of wages in accord with the drop or
rise of the index. At this writing, headlines tell of a two-cent hourly
wage cut General Motors workers will suffer for the first quarter
of 1949. And that came just at the moment when other divisions ' of
the auto union, and other unions, too, entered negotiations for a
"fourth round" wage raise. The union's own research director revealed that auto workers, in terms of purchasing power, were 20 percent behind their rea/, wages of January, 1945.
On another occasion Reuther endorsed a statement of the N ational Plan'ning Association that conditioned wage increases upon
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an increase in productivity. In 1946, he gained much publicity for
his celebrated "look at the books" and "ability to pay" thepry that
would tie wages to what an employer's books show on profit earnings. Inversely, this theory justifies a wage cut if an employer could
"prove" he didn't have a profitable year and is not "able" to pay.
Reuther, it seems, is ready to seize upon any formula but the one
that says: a worker must get at least what the University of California's Heller Committee finds neceSJary for a Ilhealth and decencylJ
stand.wd for a family of four-$78.50 a week in January, 1949.
Reuther's Social-Democratic friend, Emil Rieve, similarly came
forward in 1947 with an an~ouncement that in the interest of
"stabilization" and "anti-inflation'" his union would not ask for a
wage raise. That announcement proved useful to employers in several cities against their striking textile workers. For it Rieve was
hailed in a Wall Street Journal editorial as a "responsible" labor
leader. More recently, when the Textron Corp. announced the closing of its plants in Nashua, N.H., and Esmond, R.I., to move South
and to Puerto Rico, Rieve revealed that the union agreed to all sorts
of speedup schemes to induce Textron to stay in New England. But
despite doubling of production, the company moved anyway. Spread
the Rieve policy of concessions throughout the industry in the
North, where his own research director admits textile wages are
96th on a New England list of 134, and what have you? Still further
slashing of wages. Some weeks later, the employers and the industry's arbitrator, used the "good business" arguments of Rieve to
flatly deny a requested lO-cent raise for cotto;t and woolen workers.
Philip Murray, along the same lines, signed a two-year contract in
1947 without an assuran'ce of a wage reopener because a change in
the contract was made entirdy subject to the steel industry's wish
to do so.
Left-progressives, just as they did in the twenties, reject
all class collaboration schemes and formulas on the ground
that they are both false in theory and paralyze the struggle
for higher wage standards, shorter hours and a curb on
speedup. No informed person takes much stock in the talk of
uplanning" ourselves out of a depression. Depressions are
the inevitable product of capitalism. The Left-progressive
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policy of struggle is aJ least a means of reducing the burden
of the crisis that the employers try to shift on the shoulders
of the working · class.

4. For Real Independent Political Action!
The trend toward independent political action which the c.I.O.
helped further was reversed after the 1944 P.A.C. campaign to one
of appending the c.I.O. to the Democratic Party. The formation of
c.I.O.-P.A.C. (now emulated by the A. F. of 1.) was a step forward
because it was originally designed to be an expression of independently cast labor votes, even though limited within the two-party
system. Instead of going ahead along that path, the c.I.O:s Right
wing swung their main energy into a struggle against those who
favored a third party.
Murray, as late a December, 1945, delivered a blistering indictment of the Truman administration in a national broadcast from
Pittsburgh. That was on the occasion when the President first made
the proposal, opposed by Murray, to hamstring strikes through a
"fact-finding, cool-off" machinery patterned after the Railway Labor
Act. Murray said the Truman administration ignored human rights,
"appeased" industry and gave only "lip service" to social legislation.
"What is the answer of the federal administration to this diabolical plot of American industry?" asked Murray. "The sole answer
of the administration is to seek legislation directed against labor .
. . . To all this arrogance the federal administration yields in abject
cowardice. Its rancor is confined to labor.
"I am profoundly disturbed at the implication inherent in the
President's proposal. It marks a very serious departure from the
policies which the people of this country have repeatedly approved
within recent years under the leadership of President Roosevelt."
The same Murray warmly greeted the President's speech to the
81st Congress and new . labor bill in which that very proposal was
again renewed. Murray never explained to the c.I.O. membership
why he made the amazing political switch.
Militant progressives, on the other hand, consistently sup-
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•

port the new· Progressive Party and refuse to be steered f rom
their path· by glittering promises, or to accept mere words as
payment upon those promises. Such temporary concessions
as are wrested from the Truman Administration are in the
main due to the pressure he, and his friends in the labor movement, feel from the working · class centers. When labor w As
robbed of the Wagner Act and placld under the Taft-Hartley
Law, many trade unionists learned how little they could depend on the two old parties. Labor's political ·p rogress would
be accelerated only through a political movement completely
.independent of Wall Street.

5. For a True Peace Policy!
•

The c.I.O:s foreign policy stand puts it behind the E.R.P.
although that program ·is quite openly referred to as lend-lease for
a war upon the Soviet Union. But even the most elementary internationallabor obligations were forgotten by the Right wing. It took a
struggle in the resolutions committee at Portland's convention to
force inclusion of even some mildly-worded oppostion to the execution of labor leaders in Greece and to recognition of Franco Spain.
The fact that our occupation forces are putting Nazi cartelists back
in business and in government hardly disturbs c.I.O. leaders these
.days. But the most shameful part of this business is the army of
C.I.O. people in "diplomatic" service in foreign lands, employed as
"labor attaches" to commissions in charge of the E.R.P. in the respective countries. They have the task of bteaking down union opposition to E.RP. and, failing in that, splitting the unions, as they did
in France and Italy.
The "cold war" idea also fits into the internal factional needs of
the C.I.O.'s top bureaucracy. It is used as a weapon against progressives in C.I.O. unions who are conveniently tagged "Russian agents."
Murray never explained the reason for his about face on foreign
policy. As late as November, 1946, at the Atlantic City convention,
the resolution adopted by the c.I.O. said: .
"Above all the common people of this country demand there be
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a fulfillment of the basic policy of OUf late President Roosevelt for
friendship and unity among the three ,great wartime allies-the
United States, Great Britain and 'the Soviet Union. Failure to accomplish this necessarily means dissension an.d strife in the world and
ultimate war.
"We reject all proposals for American participation in any bloc or
alliance which would destroy the unity of the Big Three. If we fail
to achieve unity then the world faces a war which means destruc.
tion of humanity itself."
The resolution further urged that "under no circumstances should
food or any other aid given by any couritry be used as a means of
coercing free but needy people in the exercise of their right of selfgovernment."
.
The Left wing, on the other hand, holds, essentially~ to the
policy as expressed in the C.I.O. 's past resolutions and rejects
all forms of warmongering and Soviet-baiting. It holds with
Roosevelt and Stalin that the friendly co-existence of the S0viet Union and America is both possible and imperative for
a durable pc;ace. The Left's stand against the Marshall Plan
is not based only on the increasingly apparent fact that it
does not aid those in Europe who need aid most, but that it
aims to build a warlike Western Bloc and keep the world on a
war footing. The fact that the Ruhr has shown most rapid
recovery and has become the hub of a West European arsenal,
while people in France and Italy go hWJ.gry, gives evidence
of the E.R.P. pattern. But no less impo~ant is the adverse
effect E.R.P. is having upon conditions within America~ U.S.
international trade has been hit hard by the loss of the market in Eastern EurQpe. The great unemployment on our
waterfronts is a reflection of that. Moreover, the tremendous
military budget and E.R.P. requirements tax so much of our
productive capacity that they have become the main prop
for the high cost of living. Americans have been paying for
it not only in taxes, but in high prices across the counter
as well. Labor, in America, says the Left wing, can have
a tremendous influence in shifting the world to a constructive
basis and toward disarmament, by pressing for a genuine
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peace policy and showing the promoters of war that labor
is not biting on ~heir sucker bait.

6. Restore Pol'itical Freedom!
The 'Right wing in control of the c.I.O. has moved to virtually
nullify the aut~nomy of affiliated unions. The state. and city industrial union councils have already lost all right to independent expression on policy. They were flatly informed that they must take
political dictation from general headquarters. This started with the
drive to jam the Marshall Plan down the throats of every council
and crack down on any that backed the Progressive Party. But in the
case of internatiortal affiliates, while Murray and associates are forced
to formally recognize their autonomy, the enforce~ent club over
"non-conformers" is raiding. Raiding is reprehensible, runs their
argument, but unions that "conform" to the c.I.O.'s political decisions won't be raided. Or C.I.O. leaders hide behinq subterfuges.
At the Portland convention Murray sprung the charge that a
number of el.o. affiliates aren't growing fast enough in their field
and he asked authority for the executive board to "investigate" and,
if need be, "reorganize" those unibns under new leaders. The falseness of Murray's argument is clearly evident in the fact that the
targets are unions in the office and professional, communications,
public and government, agricultural; and food, and farm equipment
fields in which these very unions broke ground for unionization.
Murray was really shielding the real running sore in the el.o.the Right-wing unions like shipbuilding, railroad, lumber and others
that have degenerated and declined frightfully in their membership.
The textile workers have not embraced more than 25 percent of the
workers in the industry since the first organizing drive a decade ago.
And Murray conveniently overlooked the fact that the very unions
ne attacked were subject to vulture raids of unions led by his qwn
supporters at the very time when the employers are trying to get rid
of collective bargaining in those fields. It seems hardly fair to attack
a union 'for not growing faster when its treasury and staff must be
given to fighting off vulmre raids of "sister" c.I.O. unions.
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In moving to kHl autonomous rights-something even the
A. F. of 1. never dared to try-the c.I.O:s leaders pose a funda-

mental question. Is the C.I.O. to be turned into a political party
and enforce the kind of discipline you'd expect in a tightly knit
political party? The basic function of a trade union is to unite its
members on the solid ground of their common economic interests.
That kind of unity can be achieved only if all workers, regardless of
political opinion and affiliation, are insured equal rights and protection. Surely, the cooperation of separate unions cannot be made a
reality unless autonomy on political opinion and candidates, on
foreign policy and like issues, is scrupulously respected.
The trade unions must, of course, advance the fight on the political front in every possible way, says the Left-wing. Every effort must
be made to find common ground on political objectives. But the
basic approach-and one which brings results--is discussion, persuasion, and voluntary action. Conviction is the key to effective
action. That was the approach of the C.I.O. in its earlier and more
successful days. While some of the Left-progressive delegates in
Portland explained to the convention why they are for the Progressive Party, the Left block did not demand in its political resolution an
endorsement of the Progressive Party. The resolution only demanded
the autonomous right of each c.I.a. union to support that party.

7.

Rest()Te Democracy in the C.I.O.

Democracy is fast being wiped out in mo~t Right-wing controlled
unions and in the c.I.O. itself. Murray's own union set the tone in
its 1948 convention with a constitutional clause forbidding the
. election of Communists, or supporters of "Communist views," even
to a committee of a local. It was at that very convention that Nick
Migas, a Communist critic of Murray's no-wage-raise policy, was
shamelessly mobbed and beaten by Right-wing delegates. Along
with such witchhunts against Communists and supporters of the
Progressive Party, leaders of other Right-wing unions, following the
steel union's example, turned their constitutions into instruments for
perpetuating burea~cratic c1iqu'e control. Terms for officers were ex17

tended to as long as four years; conventions are held less frequently;
the. number of convention delegates has been reduced; salaries of
top officers were raised to business executive levels; locals and districts were stripped of autonomous rights; shop stewards are gradually losing their real functions and grievances are processed, ~f at
all, through a top level machinery; c.I.O. councils have been turned
into rubber stamps for top policy; and expulsion of members for
views has begun to appear in certain C.I.O. unions.
All this is taking place in a movement that challenged the old
A. F. of 1. because of its bureaucratic rule. And it was only in May,
1946, that, on Philip Murray's introduction, the convention of the
steelworkers unanimoUsly adopted a policy statement which said:
eeWe ask no man his national origin, his color, his religion
or his beliefs. It is enough for us that he is a steel worker and
that he believes in trade unionism. . • • Our union has not
been and will not be an instrument of repression. It is a
vehicle for economic and social progress •..• As a democratic
institution, we engage in no purges, no witch-hunts. We do
not dictate a man's thoughts or beliefs. Most importan~ of all
we do not permit ourselves to be stampeded into courses of
action which create division among our members and sow
the disunity which is sought by those false prophets and hypocritical advisers from without who mean us no good."

The Left-progressives asked no more than adherence to this policy
so eloquently stated by Murray himself.
8. End Red-Baiting~W eapon of Disruption!
Red-baiting and suppression of political minorities now permeates official c.I.O. policy. Until Murray's foreign policy turn began,
the c.I.O. was on record against Red-baiting. So strong was the
C.I.O.'s traditional aversion to Red-baiting that even today lip service is still given to a resolution calling for the abolition of the
House Un-American Committee. But such resolutions are a mockery
in face of application within the C.I.O. itself of precisely the type
of witch-hunt practiced by the House body. Nor could c.I.O. official
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protests against witch-hunt House hearings on unions be taken seriously if a top officer like secretary-treasurer James B. Carey appeared
as a star witness against officers of his own electrical union .
• We are in effect witnessing a brazen attempt in the C.I.O. to
wipe the past from the minds of the membership and especially to
blot out the fact that Left wingers t including Communists, were the
most active forces in the initial organizing drives of most of the
key c.I.O. unions. Mur~ay himself, as director of the Steel Workers
Organizing Committee, enlisted scores of well-known Communists
for full-time work in the toughest sectors of the steel front.
The situation was the same in auto. The men who led the famous
sit-down strike in 1937 in Flint and cracked General Motors were
mainly Communists. The pioneers in the Ford organizing drive and
sparkplugs in that company's main plant, were and continue to be
the Communists. The Communists were in the very heart of the
drives that brought the maritime, transport, <;lectrical, furniture,
office, public, farm equipment, packinghouse, fur and leather, department store, shoe and other unions into existence.
As a matter of fact, there is a concerted effort by the c.I.O.
leaders to begin the history of their organization with the day
Murray was named president and to black out even the name and
role of Lewis, its first leader.
The real object is to black out the period when a united
front was in effect and forces of widely divergent views, including Communists, were able to cooperate. The Left wing
calls for ' an end of Red-baiting and restoration of the constructive atmosphere of the past, in which cooperation of
all forces in the C.I.O. was possible.

9. More Vigor For Negro Rights!
. The struggle for Negro rights, too, is becoming affected by the
atmosphere of intolerance that stifles the c.I.O. these days. It was
the C.I.O.'s early drives that smashed open the gates long shut to
.Negro workers. When the hundreds of thousands of Negro workers
poured into the steel, auto, packinghouse maritime, and other unions,
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the A. F. of 1., too, was forced to loosen its bars. As a result, a great
historic change occurred with the entrance of an estimated million
Negro workers i~to unions. The c.I.O. also showed some progress
in the advancement of Negroes to leadership in unions. In seveool
cases, notably Left unions. Negroes were elected to top offices. In
the recent period, however, signs have been increasing of c.I.O.
retreat on the problem of Negro rights. It is also ~pparent that the
Right-wing bureaucracy's present coddling of a few Negro leaders
of an Uncle Tom caliber is more of a tactic to cover up their neglect
to do something real on the problem, than a genuine effort to tackle
it. Thus, for example, when Delegate Nichols, a Negro of the Cooks
and Stewards, rose in the Portland convention to speak on the legislative report, he demanded that President Truman issue an executive order to stop segregation in the armed forces. Nichols then
added that the c.I.O. should also look into its own house and wipe
out restrictions ag~inst Negroes that still exist. Murray immediately
called on one of his supporters, President Willard Townsend of the
Transport Service Workers, Red-baiter, to reply to Nichols.
"This matter of discrimination in unions of the c.I.O., I think, is
being given too much overemphasis," said Townsend and he unleashed a barrage of insults upon Communists for raising the issue.
And what did Townsend, himself a Negro, help to cover up? It was
at the Textile Workers Union convention in Atlantic City, in April,
1948, that a group of resolutions relating to Negro rights progressed
to the point where the resolutions committee approved them for
adoption. They covered condemnation of the Ku Klux Klan and
"all efforts to divide the American people on the basis of race";
endorsement of anti-lynch legislation; opposition to segregation in
"any form"; calling for passage of a Fair Employment Practice Law
and elimination of race bias in immigration laws. Those resolutions
were not brought on the convention floor for action. Instead President Emile Rieve made a statement to newsmen that they were
"controversial" because there might be some members of the KKK
in the convention who might object!
The United Steelworkers on the other hand, has the bulk of the
Negro workers of the industry in its ranks, and they are easily a
fifth of the union's membership. But the number of Negro staff
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people out of the approximately 700 employed by the union could
be counted on one's two hands. Few Negroes are encouraged to
higher than local office. In the U.A.W., the progressives, including
the most active Negro leaders, have been waging a struggle for
years for election of a Negro to a top post. The main resistance
came from the Reuther-dominated Right wing which advances the
"theory" that giving special recognition to problems of Negro
members is "Jim Crow in reverse." It is under this false theory that
the Reutherites have consistently refused to face the issue. The
Left recognizes that it is not enough to give a Negro a membership
card. He must also get full and equal rights to be upgraded economicaPly and elected to leadership within the union.
10.

Restore True Internationalism!

On internationalism, the leaders of the C.I.O. tumbled quickly
from a prominent part in founding of the World Federation of
Trade Unions to a walkout from the W.F.T.U. They now send
agents to disrupt its affiliates. On this issue the c.I.O.'s Right wingers
show most clearly how slavishly they respond to the will of the
Wall Streeters in control of State Department policy. They first
injected the Marshall Plan issue into the W.F.T.U.'s executive body,
knowing well that no agreement was possible on this controversial
issue. Earlier James Carey told pressmen that the C.I.O. is interested
in using the W.F.T.U: as a channel for reaching European workers
because if ~ the C.I.O. recommends support of the Marshall Plan
"they [European workers} .won't be able to say it is a Wall Street
scheme." When some months later, all his maneuvers failed, he
told newsmeQ. that "Russian domination" made "our role in the
W.F.T.U. useless."
Carey obviously meant "useless" to those who found need for
"labor credentials" to sell the Marshall Plan. This is not working class
internationalism. This is cooperation with one's own trusts to dominate and exploit peoples of other lands. The position of the c.I.O.'s
Right wing raises another fundamental question: is the existence
of the W.F.T.U. to be subject to agreement on all political issues
raised? That line would obviously doom a labor international with
representatives of some three score countries.
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Ironically it was the Soviet trade union leaders who suggested that each W.F.T.U.• affiliate be autonomous in its stand
on the Marshall Plan and that the issue need not divide the
W.F.T.U. But a split is what the C.I.O. leaders wanted. At
the Portland convention the minority resolution called for
continued affiliation and W.F.T.U. concentration on those
issues upon which there is common agreement. But common
agreement is not what the C.LO.'s leaders desire.
THE CAUSE OF MURRAY'S CHANGEOVER

How is Philip Murray's changeover of recent times in almost
every field of c.I.O. policy to be explained? His change of position,
as we have seen, was most evident since he launched a campaign
for the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. But there must be
a more fundamental reason. What caused him to agree with the
Wall Streeters who supervise the government's foreign policy?
Murray himself gives a clear answer in his article in the American
magazine of June, 1948, where he wrote:
"We have no classes in this country. .That's why the Marxist
theoty of class struggle has gained so few adherents. We're all
workers here. . . . Even the division of industrial workers into
'management' and 'labor' turns out to be somewhat artificial."
The c.I.O.'s rise and the stormy struggles that took place in the
wake of its development, were powerful evidence that America is
indeed a land of class division and class struggle. It was the c.I.O.'s
advance that smashed the network of labor-management "representation plans" in the plants of the trusts and big corporations.
The c.I.O., more than any other organization in American history,
advanced the struggle of labor against the monopolies. Such experiences as the South Chicago Massacre during the 1937 "Little
Steel" strike, the Johnstown "Citizens Committee" episode in that
struggle, the killings in Youngstown and the fierceness of the
struggle in every steel town where Murray's own union entered,
hardly justifies his denial of the class struggle in America.
Historic reasons explain the false illusions and other factors that
had for a long time retarded the development of class consciousness of America's working class. They also explain w~y people
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like Murray, who favor the capitalist system, have been so strongly
entrenched in our labor movement. But notwithstanding the efforts
to blind the workers to the realities of the class struggle, class consciousness has advanced substantially in recent years.
The fact that American capitalism finds it necessary to
use the Murrays in labor's ranks to help them cChide" the
class struggle is in itself evidence of the change that is taking
place in the rank and file of the working class.

What is the practical consequence of the denial of class division?
A leader who denies class division must, sooner or later, deny the
necessity of struggle by labor and must come to the conclusion,
as Murray does, that the interests of a union can best be served
'through a policy of servility to employers or, as some choose to
call it, "labor-management cooperation." It amounts to depending
on the "good faith" of employers towards their workers. Therein
is tne source of Murray's pipedream of a beautiful "industry council plan" to regulate a "strikeless" and "classless" capitalism.
There being no division of classes, as Murray says, why should
the idea be even entertained of a political party or political action,
independent of the two old monopoly-controlled parties.
A labor leader who doesn't believe in struggle for progress
dooms the workers to stagnation, defeat and retreat. Only
those who always see a fight ahead for new objectives give
the workers a perspective' that drives forward. For one with
Murray's narrow outlook the millenium is reached when an
industry is organiZed and a labor uleader" can get down to
the steady routine of administering the affairs of the organization on the basis of cCpart;p.ership" with the other side.

The problem then becomes one of tightening a grip ·over· the
union, restricting its democracy, limiting the role of its shop stewards, stifling action below on grievances, rev-ising the constitution
to place more control at the top, lengthening the period between
conventions and elections and, above all else, outlawing those in the
union who insist that it must keep going forward-the 'Communists and all those who could be labeled "Communists."
The policy that denies the Communists a role in the
unions stems directly from the nonsense that we have neither
classes nor a class struggle. The ColJUltunists have a funda-
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mental view that calls for a steady drive forward for the
working class precisely because they recognize that the class
struggle is here and cannot be abolished under capitalism.
Those who indulge in Uno-classes" fancies are consciously
• or unconsciously working to paralyze the workers and divert
them from the only course they have under . capitalism to
gain anything-struggle. The only way the: workers can
truly be both workers and controllers of industry and have
no need of struggles like those they engage in, is through
socialism. That means the working class in political power
and the in~ustries socialized under a government it heads.
It is the ultimate perspective of socialism that gives the
Communists an unending perspective of going forward toward new objectives all the time. This is why they so often
corne in conflict with those who are stagnant, or tire of going
ahead. This is also what makes Communists the most ~on
sistent force within the camp of the progressives. This, too,
is why their leaders are being hounded and persecuted.

How explain the willingness of Communists and others of the
Left to enter into a coalition with Murray and others like him,
whose fundamental stand in suppOrt of capitalism is well known ?
The Communists enter a coalition with any forces that may offer
even a temporary and partial advancement for the workers. In doing so, they also strive independently to carry the advance as far as
possible, usually beyond the objectives of others in the coalition.
They wouldn't be real Communists if they only held in view their
ultimate aim of socialism and paid no attention to every possibility
for an immediate advancement · of the interests of the workers; or
if they just tailed behind people like Murray.
That there was harmony in the 1941-46 Murray-Left coalition
is explained by the fact that in those days even Murray's limited
perspective had much in common with the Left, notably on organizing' the steel industry and prosecution of the war effort. The
wage drive immediately after the war, largely due to the pressure
of his own members, was another factor. But with the advent of the
"cold war" policy, and the increase4 reactionary pressures of Wall
Street, Murray's fundamen~al "no classes" view came into play. He
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suddenly discovered that Communists were ·'outsiders'· and that they
"interfere" in the c.I.O.'s affairs. He is not original in this. The
"interference" cry was raised 25 years ago by the A. F. of L.'s
bureaucrats when their bankrupt craft unionism was challenged.
It was when the C.I.O.'s top leaders embraced the "cold war"
that the activities of the Left turned into "interference" for them.
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, in his addr~ss before
the Portland delegates, attempted to gIve labor leaders of America a
perspective. His speech is being circulated by the Right wingers
as an historic document. Justice Douglas, tOO, views America as
a land with classes. But he is worried because in Europe there is a
rapid movement toward Socialism and class lines are deeply rooted
even in the West. He sees it a~ the mission of America to "guide
Western civilization" away from the path of socialism. Justice
Douglas noted, however, that American diplomacy, under . the direction of business magnates, has not been successful in that mission
because of a failure to gain the confidence, or even the ear of people.
This is where the role qf labor leaders (he mentioned Reuther
as an example) comes in, because they are "peculiarly qualified
to bridge a gap that has been growing between the United States
and Europe."
"Out of this arises the importance of the fact that American
labor carries good credentials to Western Europe," said Justice
Douglas. "Doors tightly closed to all others may open at its knock.
Words from American labor promise to find quick acceptance."
Douglas' perspective is for American labor leaders to be the front
men for American business as salesmen of the Marshall Plan and
propagandists for our "human welfare state" as he pictures out' capitalist system in America. He opened to the Right wingers the
vista of a green pasture of diplomatic appointments
Some weeks earlier, leaders of both the A. F. of 1. and C.I.O.
were elated over a chapter in a new book by Eric Johnston, film
czar and former head of the Chamber of Commerce. In his We're
AllIn It Johnston called ·for the appointment of labor leaders like
. David Dubinsky. to diplomatic posts on the ground that they would
do better than business men in selling "our way of life" to the
Europeans. Neither Johnston nor Douglas were original. Walter
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Reuther, speaking before the ClO. convention in Boston, in 1947,
was critical of the State Department for not using labor leaders
to put over the Marshall Plan in Europe.

THE MAIN SOURCE OF C.I.O. STRIFE

Where does the main source of factional strife stem from in the
c.I.O.? The Social-Democrats and the Association of Catholic Trade
Unionists are the two groups that have been pressing for the present
J?Olicy of the c.I.O. since the days before the war. They have engaged in every conceivable disruptive tactic. Their main line was
to disrupt the "Left-middle" coalitiop that held the c.I.O. to its early
and wartime progressive direction. The main tactic was Redbaiting, use of the House Un-American Committee and the help of
employers, Chamber of Commerce, N.A.M. and of the newspapers.
They supply the witnesses and fingermen for the witch-hunters.
These groups were most helpful to the Taft-Hartleyites because they
were primarily interested in the anti-Communist affidavit as a
means of eliminating Left-progressives from union office.
The heart of the program of Social Democracy is war upon the
Soviet Union. The Social-Democrats' of America have worked with
might and main to pressure American labor for support of Wall
Street's program of .world conquest with Social-Democrats in Western Europe a ready base for it. Everything else is secondary to the
Social-Democratic union leaders. Hence their readiness to collaborate with the trusts for a renamed Taft-Hartley Law (as Dubinsky has already proposed); on wage policies, like the ReutherGeneral Motors "escalator clause" formula or Rieve's wage policy;
for watering down of pro-labor legislative measures before Congress and on knifing working-class progress toward a new political
party. Reuther, Rieve, Emil Mazey, secretary-treasurer of the U.A.W.,
George Baldanzi, vice-president of Textile, are among the leaders
of the c.I.O.'s Social-Democrats. They are noted for a mOJ;e demagogic and polished way to hoodwink the workers, thanks to their
"socialist" background.
The A.C.T.U. came into existence in the late thirties at the
direction of a Vatican policy that allows Catholics to join "neutral"
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\ not Catholic-controlled) unions only if they have their own associations to guide them in those organizations. In its initial stages
the A.C.T.V.'s Red-baiting line was not too strongly pronounced.
Hut suppression of the anti-Semitic pro-Nazi movement led by
Father Charles Coughlin channeled much of · this element into the
new~born A.C.T.V. This coincided with the unfolding of the V-atican's line for a shift of the anti-fascist war to a war against the
Soviet Union.
The very idea of a faction in the trade unions based on religious .
lines is obnoxious to AmerIcans. One of our most cherished tradidons has been strictly observed in American unions. We had never
known of religious cleavages in unions since the earliest 9rganizations 150 years ago. But the A.C.T.V. brought with it the Vatican
pattern of "Catholic unionism" like the type that has been dividing labor in some European countries, and the economic program
of clerical fascism like the kind now in effect, with Vatican blessing,
in Franco Spain and Salazar's Portugal. The A.C.T.V., too, is
plugging for an "industrial council plan" and points to Gen. De
Gaulle's plan for a Franco-like corporate state economic machinery
in place of unions, as the very image of the A.C.T.V.'s program
for America. Patronage, bonus and production speed-up plans of
non-union companies, notably Eastman Kodak, are pointed to by
the A.C.T.V. as fine examples of "enlightened relations."
The A.C.T.V. is small in membership and has less than a score
of branches in the country. The majority of Catholic trade unionists
resent its activities and especially the use of their faith to cover up
disruptive and company-union-like operations. But the A.C.T.V.,
guided by a number of priests who have been assigned as chaplains
of its branches, and closely tied to many top leaders in the c.I.O.,
is a powerful influence. 'Murray greeted its 1948 convention although years .back he privately resented A.C.T.V. interference in
the c.I.O.'s affairs.

THE LEFT'S PERSPECTIVE
From the foregoing we have seen that the Left wing of the labor
movement is not something imported or 'injected into it. It is a trend
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that has been deeply rooted in the American working class since
the great struggles of the last century. It has been steadily watered
and invigorated by the lessons of those struggles. Despite savage
repression each succeeding progressive upsurge was greater in
scope and more vigorous in development. In time parts of the
Left program, although bitterly fought by the old guard, became a
part of the pattern for most or all of labor. Industrial unionism,
organization of the basic mass production industries, unemployment
insurance and the shop steward system are now accepted.
• We h~ve also seen that some forces go along for a time with the
progressive trend only to pull back into the conservative camp
whence they came. Rank and file pressure among their members,
an upsurge for organization such as blossomed out in the early
stages of the Roosevelt administration, or a desire to get the help
of the Left for certain limited advances, may temporarily bring a
Lewis, Murray, Reuther or a Dubinsky into common cause with
progressives. Some honest conservatives learn from the good results and experience in unity with the Left, and they often themselves
develop into progressives. Others, however, clinging to views that
hold them to basic agreement with the capitalist class, confine their
interest to opportunist advantage; to gaining a base for themselves
in a union, or political power. They look for th~ earliest opportunity to cut themselves loose from alliances with the Left so as to
have a free hand in consolidating their machines and entrenching
their bureaucracies; They then view those who want further progress as an obstacle, as "interferers" with the "new" policy of playing ball with the corporations. At the bottom of such shift in
policy by men like Murray is the denial of the class division and
the class struggle. There being no class division why should a
union see foreign policy, politics or economics differently than a
corporation, they declare.
That does not mean, however, that Left forces demand full acceptance of their program as a basis for cooperation with other
groups in the labor movement. On the contrary, the interests of the
working class as well as progressive influence, are served best where
the Left enters into united fronts with others on the basis of one or
a group of issues, for a long or short range period.
One of the major reasons' for weakness of labor in the past has
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been the tendency of advanced groups to split away from the main
stream and set up "pure" and highly disciplined new unions. With
very few exceptions such ventures turned out a failure.
In effect, secession or the voluntary isolation of progressives
to their own corner i~ a form of escape from the far more
difficult struggle of winning the workers away from the reactionaries and doing so within the labor movement where most
of the workers belong. One of Foster's greatest contributions to the labor movement of America was to call a halt to
such tendencies of left isolation.

The often-heard charge from Right-wing quarters that c.I.O.
progressives plan to split away and form a "third labor movement" is not only a falsehood but an attempt to fan secessionism.
The Rig~t wing would like nothing better than to be rid of progressives by such voluntary isolation. Precisely because the main
tactic of the old guard aims to isolate and narrow it, the Left is always falsely referred to as Communist. The main target of this
Red-baiting tactic are those in the progressive camp who do not
go as far as the Communists but who do go along with them on
certain immediate issues. Unless the Left is alert against Red-baiting
this splitting tactic of the enemy takes effect.
The objective of the Left wing in the labor movement
is far short of the program of the Communists. It does not
call for abolition of capitalism and its replacement by a socialist order, as do the Communists. The Left wing is generally uruted on objectives that it strives to achieve within
the framework of capitalism; it represents the vigorous and
militant wing of labor and it rejects the concept that labor
can gain by collaboration with emp~oyers.

In fact it would be wrong to ascribe the objectives of the Left
to all those in the c.I.O. who are so often classed as Left wingers.
The Portland convention demonstrated that a common program is
only shaping in the Left wing of the c.I.O. Not all in the Left
camp supported all the minority resolutions in that convention.
There was evidence of some disunity and lack of clarity in the
c.1.0:s Left on several important issues.
In the main, this confusion stems from the fact that the c.I.O:s
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progressives developed as the best supporters and fighters for what
was commonly known as "C.lO. policy."
That was a safe slogan so long as C.I.O. policy expressed
progress. But the C.I.O.'s progressives neglected to give
clear expression to their own independent and more fundamental view so as to establish: first, · the basic difference
that divides them from the reactionary Right wing, especially the Social-Democrats and the Association of Catholic
Trade Unionists; second, that people like Murray with whom
they were in a coalition are not basically progressive.

Such clarity would have enabled the progressives more readily to
see the change in Murray's line when it began to show itself and
all the sooner be rid of the illusion that "Cl.O. policy" continued
to mean what it meant in the first decade of the organization.
The fact that those in the C.I.O.'s saddle have so shamelessly
abandoned the c.I.O.'s early spirit does not mean that the membership or that those in the lower echelons of leadership, have
dc::>ne so. At Portland, Murray found it necessary to give lip service
to the "spirit of '36," because he knows most people in the c.I.a.
long for it. But his promises to return to that spirit mean nothing
because he is waging war against the very forces that were the
soul of the drives that made the c.I.a.
The resurgence of a fighting, advancing C.lO. would undoubtedly
go a long way toward reversing the reactionary trend in the country.
The c.I.a. could once more be the pace-setter .for labor and it
would not be the reactionary A. F. of L. leaders who would be
calling the tune, as they are doing now. But such needea revival
will nor come with the approval of the Murrays and Reuthers.
It can only come as a result of a new coalition, including the Left
progressives and based on a; new stage of struggles.
What is the basis upon which such a new coalition can arise?
Does it have to be a Left coalition? No, it doesn't have to be hased
on a Left program. But it does require reaffirmation of the principles tested in the founding days of the c.I.a.
Given the will to concentrate on an improvement of the living
standards of the workers and to unite all on that objective irrespective of political opinion, it would not be hard to also agree on the
following program:
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1. Restoration of political autonomy for C.I.O. affiliates,
political freedom in each union, and lifting of tbp censorship over C.I.O. state ind city councils. Agreement ol.l political issues, including foreign policy must be once again
put on the basis of voluntary agreement and non-coercive
persuasion without restriction of the rights of any minority.
2. Restoration of autonomy in all respects so that a 'c.I.O.
charter would mean .protection from interference or coercion
from the top C.I.O., as well as from raids and disruption of
sister C.I.O. unions.
3. Turning of the principal attention, energy and resources
of the C.I.O. and its unions, to the original major task of
organizing the unorganized. That, of course, would also
mean return to the original practice of mobilizing the best
of the C.I.O.'s organizing forces, with ability and devotion
the yardstick, not political opinions.
4. Abandonment of the paralyzing theories of management-labor cooperation to speed up production, in face of the
urgent need of waging a struggle to curb menacing speed-up
in industry and combat spreading unemployment.
5. Shift of wage policy back to one of advancing the real
w~ges of the workers, not m~rely trailing the cost of living,
as now. This de~ands abandonment of such formulas as
would tie wages to productivity, cost of living, profits or
a company's bookkeeping. That would clear the decks for
militant united action by C.I.O. unions on ·wages.
6. Elimination of Taft-Hartleyism from the C.I.O.'s bloodstream. This calls for m~re than u"nity of all C.I.O. unions
for elimination of Taft-Hartley legislation, or its reenact, ment under a new name. Above all, it demands an end of
scab practices like raiding, bre~king strikes and using antilabor laws against other unions that Taft-Hartleyism
brought into labor's ranks. The elementary untion principle
of (tAll for one and one for all" must again be restored.
7. The end of Red-baiting .and restoration of democracy
in the C.I.O. The practice of discriminating aga~st persons
for Communist, Progressive Party, or other political affiliation, must end.

31

8. Continuance of the progress toward .internationalism
. begun by, the C.I.O. when it took a prominent part in the
formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Issues
like .the Marshall Plan must not be
cause for a split, but
should be left to each W.F.T.U. affiliate.
9. More energetic efforts to advance the struggle for Negro
rights. This means not only support of civil rights legislaiton but also real effort within the C.I.O. and its affiliates to
encourage adval!«;~ment of Negroes for high union office and
economic upgrading in all spheres.
1 O. A real offensive to bring all of American labor into
one federation, and recognition of the well-established fact
that reliance upon the top leaders of the A. F. of L. and
C.I.O. will not bring about such unity. it will take an extensive educational campaign to arouse pressure for it.
Is there anything "revolutionary" in the above 10 points? They do
not even embody the full Left-wing program. But they do provide
the basis for the free, vigorous and _united unionism in the c.I.a.
A new surge of militancy and progressivism on a higher level
than ever before, will inevitably sweep through both the A. F. of
L. and c.I.a. Top reactionary control, no matter how tight, and
despite the protective cordon of a thousand constitutional clauses
and repressive edicts against progressives, will not stop that surge.
Dictatorial rule in the A. F. of L. couldn't stop the progressivism
of the thirties from breaking out. Already there are indications of
the coming trend in rank and file pressure for wage increases and
against speedup that is showing itself in some of the Right wing-led
unions.
The sweep of layoffs as this is written and the unmistaken evidence that we are heading toward another depression still further
showing up the bankruptcy of the Right wingers. They do nOt
have a program to meet the situation, and cannot have one, as long
as they are bound hand and foot to a policy of war preparation:
But in the same measure that disillusion with the Right wing takes
effect, so developments throw a challenge to the progressive forces in
the labor movement. It is upon their unity and initiative that the
next stage forward for labor will depend.
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